On the Charge of Ontotheology

Much time has been spent attacking the critiques of Natural Theology and the chief arguments for the existence of God from contemporary analytical philosophy. So this post will not be spent with those critiques. There is a charge made within continental philosophy which is not often responded to nor addressed within contemporary Anglophone philosophy. The charge of “ontotheology”. This has its roots within the critiques of philosophy by Luther, in the Critique of Pure Reason by Kant, and most recently in the work of Martin Heidegger. The principle work in English responding to this charge in contemporary is Thomas Joseph White’s “Wisdom in the Face of Modernity”.

This post will proceed in three stages. The first will be laying out what exactly is the charge of ontotheology and why it is a problem for philosophical theism. The second will be in explaining some forms of philosophical theism that this charge does hit its mark against and how devastating the blow is. The third will be in explaining some theistic systems the charge does not land against and why it does not affect them. Too keep the length down to a minimum I will avoid quotation and direct citation as much as possible.

Ontotheology.

So, the first question is what exactly is the charge of ontotheology? The charge of ontotheology is the charge that God has been built into the logic of some system of philosophy. So that any argument for the existence of God from that system is open to the charge of vicious circularity. This would be fatal to natural theology, for any attempt at a proof of the existence of God and the deduction of various attributes of God would have presupposed the truth of the very conclusion it attempts to establish.

So, what is the sufficient condition for ontotheology? It would appear sufficient for the charge that God is subsumed under the object of metaphysics. This would mean that metaphysics begins with the study of being which is both divine and finite. So that by insight into being as immediately present to the intellect, we come to a notion of being which is at once both finite and infinite. Both creator and created. Natural Theology, then, would not be the goal, or end, of metaphysics but woven into the very fabric of interrogating the question of being. If insight into the being of beings at once disclosed the being of the divine, we’d have within metaphysics a subtle presupposition of the existence of the divine. For divine being would itself be part of the object of the science, and a science does not prove the existence of its object but is presupposing it. Whether from another science delivering the object for study or because the object of the science is immediately accessible to the intellect through perception. An example of the former would be natural philosophy delivering the object of the natural sciences for more advanced and sophisticated analysis via experimentation rather than simple observation. Whilst an example of the latter would be in Natural Philosophy’s object of changeable being, also known as ens mobile following Aristotle, and Metaphysics’ object of being qua being.

So if divine being is taken to be part of the object of metaphysics, we’d have a presupposition of God’s existence built into the very logic of the ontological thought it is built upon. The seriousness of this charge should not be underestimated. If the charge strikes true, Natural Theology is stuck within a vicious circularity. For any arguments which then employ the notion of being within which divine being is taken to be contained within would presuppose the very proposition sought to be proven. For the existence of the object of science is taken for granted by every science. Just as physics presupposes its object of changeable beings in relation with each other, as chemistry presupposes the existence of chemically reactive substances, as biology presupposes the existence of living beings, as mathematics presupposes that there is quantity and structure, metaphysics supposes being. One cannot prove or demonstrate the object of study from within the subject which it is the object of.

Fatality.

The question immediately arises; are there systems of theistic philosophy which the charge of ontotheology actually strikes true against? The simple answer is, yes. There are certainly systems of philosophy which subsume the being of the divine and the being of beings under the same object with a univocal unity in the application of the fundamental notion. These would be any systems of philosophy which presuppose we have a concept of God. For if we have a concept of God, then God is subsumed within our most fundamental and most general concept of being. Many, but not all, of the currents within contemporary theistic philosophy, fall prey to this. Whether it is through the application of a notion of personhood to both human person and the Absolute in the self-same way, or through supposing we have a concept which means we can formulate a definition of God a priori without first demonstrating the existence of the subject to be defined, it does not matter. Both these approaches subsume God within the horizon of being immediately present to the knowing being in the world. And thus, subsume God under the object of metaphysics.

So how devastating is the blow? To the systems of theistic philosophy which make this error. The blow is fatal. Any argument which follows this error will have presupposed the truth of its conclusion within the object of metaphysics and thus its arguments become viciously circular. For the fundamental notion at play within philosophy has always already presupposed the truth of the proposition sought to be demonstrated. That is the proposition «God exists» and various attributes of God.

As far as critiques of Natural Theology go, this charge of ontotheology is easily the most serious critique and argument for atheism. If it were true that the existence of God is never discovered but simply presupposed by theistic metaphysics, then one must either argue the existence of God and his attributes is self-evident, adopt a form of fideism where it is impossible to know that God exists, or simply adopt atheism. The first option appears clearly absurd for there is no prima facie repugnance to the proposition «God does not exist». The second is the death of reasonable faith in theology and of philosophically serious theism as it amounts to assent without sufficient reason. Whilst the third would appear to have sufficient reason for affirmation if the antecedent is true. For then any form of theism would be based upon a kind of blind faith and the philosophical arguments contain a subtle invalidity. For the conclusion would be already present upon the employment of the crucial terms of the argument.

So, the question discloses itself. Are there forms of theistic philosophy which avoid the charge of ontotheology and thus make reasonable faith truly possible? To this important question, we now turn.

The Path Not Forgotten.

As I mentioned earlier, the chief requirement for ontotheology is the notion of God being inbuilt into the object of metaphysics. So are there theistic traditions which resist this error? We can turn to the disputes which occurred within Medieval Metaphysics amongst the Aristotelians. The dispute as to whether God is the object and subject matter of metaphysics. Some argued in the affirmative that God indeed is the object and subject matter of metaphysics and this object was delivered to the intellect through Natural Philosophy. Whilst others, such as Thomas Aquinas, argued in the negative. That the object of metaphysics is not being as said of he who is above all, but of being in general or ens commune. That is, the object is common being, which is the first and immediate object of the intellect.

This is affirmed by Aquinas in his prologue to the Commentary on the Metaphysics and elsewhere. For an in-depth treatment and analysis of all relevant texts; Wippel’s major work “The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas” and White’s book “Wisdom in the Face of Modernity” are recommended. Given that this would make knowledge of God the end, or goal, of metaphysics without subsuming God under the object and subject matter of metaphysics it avoids the charge of ontotheology. For the analogical unity of the application of the notion of being precludes being functioning as a common genus which includes God, immaterial beings, and material beings.

Now, some would argue that there are medieval schoolmen that the charge does find its target against. Whilst Heidegger appeared to, at least in his earliest writings, hold that it found its target against all the major schoolmen. Which included Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Suarez. This does not appear to be the case. We’ve already addressed Aquinas, but what about Duns Scotus? I am unable to address Suarez as I have not read him on the notion of being and my Latin is not sufficient to read his metaphysical disputations directly.

Some have argued that Scotus commits himself to an ontotheological error through his understanding that being as said to God and creatures is employed univocally. However, this appears to misunderstand what Scotus means by univocity. For Scotus, it appears sufficient for univocity that it is contradictory to affirm and deny a predicate of the self-same subject. So as long as it would be contradictory to affirm or deny both infinite and finite of being, necessary and contingent of being, etc, Scotus holds this affirms univocity. Univocity, then, appears to concern the sameness of the concept applied rather than a difference in the application of the concept. Scotus in his Questions on the Metaphysics explicitly asserts that God is not to be understood as the subject of metaphysics, but knowledge of God is the ultimate goal of metaphysics. For relevant readings from Scotus, I would recommend «Duns Scotus; Philosophical Writings» translated by Allan Wolter. Thus, it appears from his own writings that Scotus is immune to the charge of ontotheology.

This could only ever have been a cursory excursion into the most serious charge against theistic philosophy. One that would render any theological knowledge gleaned by the natural light of reason alone simply invalid due to petitio principii. But, although cursory, I hope it has at least been instructive and enlightening.

Pax domini vobiscum